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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
THE ORGANIZATION OF
PUBLIC PROPRIETARY INTERESTS*
VINCENT OSTROM**

INTRODUCTION
The structure of property rights in natural resource development is
undergoing a basic shift to public ownership and the supply of resource services and amenities by intermediate public suppliers. Many
of these services, including maintenance of environmental qualities,
are not subject to provision as marketable commodities. Nor are they
subject to exclusive ownership and control by individuals as private
properties. Many environmental qualities and resource services are
subject to joint use or consumption by communities of individuals.
Where exclusive control is infeasible, the supply of such environmental qualities and resource services is likely to be secured through
public instrumentalities. If property rights are viewed as the terms
and conditions for asserting claims to anything of value, we are confronted with the task of determining how recourse to public solutions is likely to affect patterns of resource development and utilization.
Reliance upon public sector solutions requires careful assessment
of the consequences that are associated with public or nonmarket
arrangements. Ironically, the organizational principles applicable to
public proprietorships are being seriously disputed at a time when
increasing reliance is placed upon public sector solutions. Different
schools of thought engage in different diagnostic assessments and
formulate different prescriptions for dealing with problems of institutional weakness and failure in the public sector.' These issues are
the subject of paradigmatic dispute in the study of public administration and political science.
Any consideration of the changing nature of property rights in
relation to resources and environmental qualities must give attention
to these different approaches to problems of public sector organiza*An earlier version of this paper was prepared for presentation to the National Water
Commission. A fuller presentation regarding the structure of water rights and the development of public organizational arrangements in California is available in my Institutional
Arrangements for Water Resource Development 207-304 (1971).
**Professor of Political Science, Indiana University, Bloomington
1. For a fuller discussion of these issues see my Alabama lectures on The Intellectual
Crisis in American Public Administration (1973).
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tion. This paper will compare two different approaches to the
analysis and design of public organizational arrangements. The traditional approach to public sector organization has been formulated in
the principles of public administration and enunciated in various
administrative reorganization efforts over the last several decades.
This approach has been challenged by a number of political
economists who have developed a different mode of analysis for
dealing with public organizational arrangements.
The two approaches depart from different premises and rely upon
different primary concepts. The conclusions derived from the two
approaches are often at sharp variance. The traditional public administration approach uses government as the basic unit of analysis and
relies upon the concept of hierarchy as basic to the organization of
administration. The approach of political economists uses the
individual as the basic unit of analysis, relying upon the concepts of
externalities, common properties and public goods to characterize
situations involved in the provision of public services. The two view
differing organizational arrangements as appropriate to provision of
public goods and services. The potential applicability of one or the
other approach to problems of public organizational arrangements is
important, since different concepts give rise to different design
possibilities.
Careful assessment should be made of the consequences that are
likely to follow from different types of public organizational arrangements, because unless we know the consequences, the decision to go
"public" can exacerbate rather than alleviate problems of resource
development and utilization.
THE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION APPROACH
In his essay on The Study of Administration Woodrow Wilson
layed the foundations for a new science of administration based on a
radical distinction between politics and administration. According to
Wilson, governments may differ in the political principles underlying
their constitutions, but principles of "good" administration will be
much the same in any system of government. "So far as administrative functions are concerned, all governments have a strong structural
likeness; more than that, if they are to be uniformly useful and
efficient, they must have a strong structural likeness.''2
Good administration, according to Wilson, will be hierarchically
ordered in a system of graded ranks, subject to political direction by
heads of departments at the center of government. The ranks of
2. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Public Administration, 2 Pol. Sc. Q. 218 (1887).
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administration will be filled by a corps of technically trained civil
servants "prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization, with an appropriate hierarchy
and characteristic discipline. .

.. "

Efficiency is attained by perfec-

tion in the hierarchical ordering of a technically trained public service. Efficiency is also conceptualized in economic terms: "the
utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost of either
money or of energy." 4
Wilson's basic theoretical suppositions can be stated as follows:
1. There is but one rule of good administration for all governments
alike.
2. Perfection in hierarchical ordering of a professionally trained
public service is the one rule of good administration.
3. Perfection in hierarchical ordering will maximize efficiency as
measured by least cost expended in money or effort in realizing
policy objectives.
The study of public administration developed within this framework of suppositions proposed by Wilson. When confronted with the
task of establishing or reforming public organizational arrangements,
practitioners engaged in traditional administrative surveys relied upon
certain principles of organization. These principles include: 1) unity
of command, 2) span of control, 3) departmentalization by major
functions of government, 4) assignment of subordinate authority to
single heads of units, and 5) centralization of staff and management
functions in the chief executive. 5
Over the past several decades, thousands of administrative surveys
and reorganization proposals have been made based upon these
theoretical presuppositions and principles of organization. The
standard format of such surveys begins with a diagnostic assessment
of problems and pathologies Which are assumed to be associated with
proliferation of agencies, fragmentation of authority, overlapping of
jurisdictions and duplication of services. Duplication of services and
overlapping jurisdictions are presumed to be prima facie wasteful and
inefficient. Particularistic interests are viewed as special interests,
which are necessarily biased, in contrast to the public interest, which
takes account of the general interests in a community. Only those
who represent the general interest are thought to possess objectivity
in development of public policy.
Based upon this diagnosis of social pathologies, reforms are pro3. Id. at 216.

4. Id. at 197.
5. J. Pfiffner, Public Administration (1946). See Ch. 5, The Principlesof Administrative
Organization 65 et seq.
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posed which would eliminate the proliferation of agencies, fragmentation of authority, overlapping jurisdictions and duplication of
functions. Large jurisdictions are preferred to small. Generalauthority agencies are preferred to limited-authority agencies.
Centralized solutions are preferred to authority diffused among
diverse decision structures.
The 1966 report by the Committee for Economic Development on
Modernizing Local Government illustrates this mode of analysis. The
CED report restates many of the standard propositions in its assessment of the pathologies inherent in the fragmentary structure of
American local government. It then recommends: 1) the elimination
of 80 per cent of the units of local government in the United States;
2) severe curtailment of the number of overlapping layers of local
government; 3) severe reduction in the number of locally-elected
officials; and 4) reliance upon a "single chief executive ... with all
administrative agencies and personnel fully responsible to him." 6
Considering how to revise the boundaries of local government, the
CED report concludes that "this function is wholly inappropriate to
the local units themselves; they lack objectivity." 7 In a similarly
reasoned essay on "Federal Grants and the Reform of State and
Local Governments," Terrance Sandalow concludes that:
The question of how state and local governments are to be reformed
and reorganized is not, in short, one with respect to which Congress
can properly remain indifferent. Ajudgment that strengthened state
and local governments are necessary to enable the nation to cope
adequately with its urban problems must rest ultimately upon some
conception of the roles which state and local governments are
expected to perform in the years ahead. Responsibility for defining
these roles appropriatelybelongs with Congress and the Presidentas
the most broadly representative of our political institutions.8

(Emphasis added.)
The cumulative thrust of these analyses is to judge citizens and
their local elected officials as incompetent to organize their own
public instrumentalities. By implication Congress and the President
should be vested with authority to make such decisions. Perhaps the
ultimate solution in this tradition is to extend the authority of the
President under the Administrative Reorganization Act to initiation
of reorganization plans for all state and local governments, subject
6. Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing Local Government 17 (1966).

7. Id.
8. T. Sandalow, Federal Grants and the Reform of State and Local Governments, in
Financing the Metropolis 193, J. Crecine ed. (1970).
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only to Congressional veto. Such a possibility is but one step away
from the conclusion in one study which suggests:
If the American federal system is to be truly a system (their emphasis) of relationships, rather than a jumble, it must be guided by a
consistent set of principles. That guidance can come from a single
source of authority-thePresident (emphasis added). He must define
the principles and apply them in the legislation that
he proposes and
9
the way that he directs the execution of the laws.
THE APPROACH OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMISTS
Since World War H the traditional public administration theory of
organization has come under increasing attack. Several efforts have
been made to reformulate organization theory. The approach that
appears to offer the most promise has been developed by a number
of political economists who were concerned with public expenditure
and public investment decisions and the implications that such
decisions have for efficient resource allocation in the American
economy. Typically, these political economists 1) use the individual
as the basic unit of analysis, 2) use the theory of externalities, common properties and public goods to define the structure of events
relevant to public administration, 3) analyze the consequences that
different organizational or decision-making arrangements have upon
the output of public goods or services, and 4) evaluate these consequences by whether or not the outcome is consistent with the efficiency criterion.
Model of Man
Most political economists base their work on methodological
individualism and use the perspective of a representative individual or
set of representative individuals in their analyses. Assumptions about
the individual normally include reference to 1) self-interest, 2)
rationality, 3) information, 4) law and order, and 5) the choice of a
maximizing strategy.
The assumption of self-interest implies that each individual has
preferences which affect the decisions he makes, and that those
preferences may differ from individual to individual. Rationality is
defined as the ability to rank all known alternatives available to the
individual in a consistent manner.1 0 Assumptions about information
usually refer to three levels of information, certainty, risk, and uncer9. Organizing U.S. Social and Economic Development 30, Pub. Ad. Rev. 625, 630

(1970).
10. See A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) for an excellent statement of these assumptions.
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tainty.' 1 Under certainty or risk, an analyst can project a relatively
determinant solution to a particular problem. Under conditions of
uncertainty, the determinateness of solutions is replaced by conclusions about the range of possible solutions.
Once uncertainty is postulated, it may be further assumed that an
individual learns about states of affairs as he develops and tests
strategies.1 2 He estimates the consequences of strategies. If the
predictions prove to be accurate a more reliable image of the world is
established. If predicted events fail to occur, he is forced to change
his image of the world and modify his strategies.1 As the individual
learns, the assumption of rationality may also have to be modified to
allow for a reordering of preferences to reflect his more accurate
assessments of the opportunity costs inherent in different alternatives.
An assumption of uncertainty also implies that one of the essential
considerations in the design of organizational arrangements is
development and use of information. Planning and deliberation are
activities that seek to clafify alternatives and their consequences.
Essential characteristics of organizational arrangements are the
extent to which they evoke or exclude relevant information and the
effect they have upon the error proneness of decisionmakers.
Classical economic theory postulates that economic man will act
within the limits of "lawful" conduct. Most analysis by political
economists is predicated upon some condition of law and order
where basic definitions of rights, duties, privileges and exposures
exist. Some basic constitutional settlement is assumed to exist either
in the larger political environment or among segments of the domain
being considered. In short, some political structure is assumed to
provide a context for analysis. In the absence of any law and order
assumption, it might be necessary to assume a Hobbesian state of war
as the prevailing human condition.
The assumption that individuals will adopt a maximizing strategy
implies an individual will Consistently choose those alternatives he
thinks will provide the greatest net benefit as weighed by his own
preferences. This can also be expressed as the choice of the least-cost
strategy and is equivalent to the efficiency criterion. Maximization
under uncertainty is not possible in a formal mathematical sense.
Yet, it is possible to assume that individuals will attempt to maximize subject to uncertainty. An individual who pursues a maximiz11.
12.
Amer.
13.

F. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (reissued 1965).
Simon, Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science 496,
Econ. Rev. 253-83 (1959).
G. Shackle, Decision, Order and Time in Human Affairs (1961).
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ing strategy in the absence of knowledge of all alternatives and of the
costs
of learning about added possibilities would act as if he were
,,satisficing.,,
4
Structure of Events
Political economists assume that rational, self-interested individuals who pursue maximizing strategies will face a variety of situations. The structure of events in different situations can be characterized by their relative divisibility or indivisibility. The degree to
which events can be subject to control by individual persons through
possession, exchange or use is the critical criterion in establishing
their divisibility or indivisibility. Those events not subject to such
control have the characteristics of involving interdependencies and
commonalities in their possession and use.
Events involved in any decisionmaking situation can be arrayed on
a continuum ranging from purely private to purely public."i
"Goods" are events for which people have preferences; "bads" are
events for which people have aversions. The potential demand for
most goods will exceed the supply and will be scarce; the supply of
most bads will exceed demands and thus require efforts to restrict or
alter their supply. Purely private goods are defined as those which are
highly divisible and can be packaged, contained or measured in
discrete units. These are distributed under competitive market conditions where potential consumers can be excluded from enjoying the
benefit unless they are willing to pay the price. Purely public goods,
by contrast, are highly indivisible goods and services. Potential consumers cannot be easily excluded from enjoying the benefit once a
public good is produced. 1 6 Once public goods are provided for
some, they will be available for others to enjoy without reference to
who pays the costs. National defense is a classic example of such a
good. Once it is provided for some individuals living within a nation,
it is automatically provided for all individuals within the nation
whether they pay for it or not.
In addition to the two logical categories of purely private and
purely public goods, most political economists would postulate the
existence of an intermediate continuum. Within this continuum, the
production or consumption of goods or services may involve spill14. J. March and H. Simon, Organizations (1958). See especially Ch. 6, Cognitive Limits
of Rationality.
15. Davis and Winston, On the Distinction between Public and Private Goods, 57 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 340-73 (1967). Also note Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,
36 Rev. Econ. and Statistics 387-89 (1954).
16. Breton, A Theory of the Demand for Public Goods, 32 Canadian J. Econ. and Pol.
Sci. 455-67 (1966).
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over effects or externalities which are not isolated and contained
within market transactions.' ' Goods with appreciable externalities
are similar to private goods to the extent that some effects can be
subject to the exclusion principle, but other of their effects are like
those of public goods and impinge upon people not directly
involved. 1 8 Water pollution which results from a prior use of water is
an example of a negative externality; the benefits which other members of a community derive from a person acquiring an education
would be a positive externality. A reduction in the cost of a negative
externality and an increase in the yield of positive externalities are
both equivalent to provision of a public good.
Common-property resources have attributes somewhat analogous
to public goods.1 I They involve a jointness of supply and a separability of use such that individuals cannot be effectively excluded
from access to the supply of a resource, even though each individual
makes a separable use of that resource. A ground water basin, for
example, affords a common water supply which is accessible to any
overlying property owner. Once extracted, the water becomes available for the separable use of each overlying proprietor. Whenever the
aggregate demand upon such a resource exceeds the available supply,
one person's increased demand will adversely affect the use of others.
Beyond certain thresholds of supply, an exclusion principle will
operate among users so that one person's use will impair use by
others, but the supply of the resource continues to be subject to a
high degree of interdependency and indivisibility. Spillover effects
occur in relation to conditions of supply and may or may not occur
in relation to conditions of use.
Public organizational arrangements are needed when significant
externalities, common pool resources or public goods are involved.
Purely private goods will not be discussed further since the market
organization functions relatively well in solving problems of production and distribution of private goods and services.
DecisionmakingArrangements
The work of political economists is based upon the assumption
that self-interested individuals who pursue maximizing strategies
utilize appropriate sets of decision rules or decisionmaking arrangements in dealing with different structures of events. No one form of
17. Ayres and Kneese, Production,Consumption and Externalities,59 Amer. Econ. Rev.
282-97 (1969). See also Buchanan and Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371-89

(1962).
18. Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J. Law and Econ. 1-44 (1960).
19. F. Christy and A. Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (1965). See Ch. 2,
The Characteristicsof Common Property NaturalResources

October 19751

PUBLIC PROPRIETARY INTERESTS

organization is presumed to be "good" for all circumstances. Rather,
any one organizational arrangement can generate a limited range of
preferred effects, and any organizational arrangement will have
limitations. Institutional weaknesses and institutional failures will
become apparent if those limits are exceeded. Thus, a particular
organizational arrangement can be expected to possess certain
capabilities and be subject to sources of weakness or failure. The
essential problem in the theory of organization is to anticipate or
predict the consequences which will follow when self-interested
individuals choose maximizing strategies by selecting particular sets
of decision rules or organizational arrangements in the context of a
particular structure of events. The optimum choice of organizational
arrangements would be that which minimizes the costs associated
with institutional weakness or institutional failure.
The analysis used by political economists in assessing the consequences that rules have on the choice of strategy in different situations will be applied to four different decisionmaking arrangements.
The first application will examine the effect of decision rules which
allow for individual choice in the presence of a common property or
public good situations. The second application will examine the
effect of decision rules characteristic of bureaucratic organization as
they apply to the organization of public agencies concerned with
supplying public goods. Given the problem of institutional weakness
and institutional failure associated with both individualistic choice
and large-scale bureaucratic establishments, consideration will then
be given to decision rules that would enable a community to reduce
costs of such weakness and failure in organizing to develop a common property resource or provide a public good. Finally, consideration will be given to development of multiorganizational arrangements as a means of providing for a heterogeneous mix of public
goods.
IndividualisticChoice and the Tragedy of the Commons
If each person is free to decide for himself how a common property resource or a public good is to be used, serious problems logically follow. Each individual will maximize his own welfare if he takes
advantage of the common property or public good at minimum cost
to himself. In the case of a public good, the cost minimizer would
have no incentive to pay his share of provision costs. Most public
goods would not be provided if paid for on a strictly voluntary basis.
In the case of a common property resource with a renewable yield,
such as that of a common water supply, individualistic choice greatly
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reduces costs of entrepreneurship as long as supply exceeds demands.
However, when the aggregate demand of all individual users exceeds
the available supply of a common property resource, an increase in
demand will create diminishing supplies and increasing costs for the
community of users. Each person will calculate only his own individual costs and ignore the social costs imposed upon others. Many
individuals will choose a "dog in the manger" strategy, pursue their
own advantage and disregard the consequences for others. Some
individuals will conceal information and may remain free to take
advantage of opportunities created by the joint actions of others. If
voluntary actions were taken to curtail demand, some individuals will
pursue a "hold out" strategy. The hold out will be free to capture a
lion's share of the benefits derived from the voluntary joint actions
of his neighbors. As long as each person is free to decide his own
course of action, the probability of someone pursuing a hold out
strategy is high. The presence of hold outs will threaten the stability
of any joint voluntary solution.
If the competitive dynamic is allowed to run its course, social
costs will escalate to a point where operations are sustained with
economic losses for the community of users. Individuals in weak
economic positions will be forced out. The neighborhood effects
generated may include poverty, deprivations, threats, and even violence. This eventuality has been characterized by Garret T. Hardin as
"the tragedy of the commons." 2 Individual decisionmaking applied
to common property resources will inexorably result in tragedy
unless decisionmaking arrangements can be modified to enable
persons to act jointly in relation to a common property. Unrestricted
individual choice in relation to common property resources or public
goods can generate destructive competition where the greater the
individual effort, the worse off people become.
Because of this competitive dynamic, individuals cannot be
expected to form large voluntary associations to pursue matters of
commorl or public interest unless special conditions can be met.2 1
These conditions will exist only 1) when members can derive a separable benefit of a sufficient magnitude to cover the cost of membership, or 2) where they can be coerced through some form of levy or
taxation into bearing their share of the costs. Thus, we cannot expect
20. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-48 (1968). Hardin makes
several analytical errors in his essay including a failure to demonstrate that the "tragedy of
the commons" applies to decisions affecting human reproduction. Nevertheless, the term
"tragedy of the commons" is an apt portrayal of the consequences which flow when
demands exceed supply in the use of a common-pool resource under conditions of individualistic choice.
21. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965).
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people voluntarily to organize themselves to secure the development
of a common property or the provision of a public good.
When individuals act with the legal independence characteristic of
decisionmaking in market structures in a situation dominated by
externalities, common property resources or public goods, we can
conclude that institutional weakness or institutional failure will
occur. The magnitude of the weakness or failure will depend upon
the importancy of the externality or the degree of indivisibility of
the common property or public good.
BureaucraticOrganization
Reliance on hierarchical organization inherent in the traditional
theory of public administration is one method for attempting to
avoid the tragedy of the commons. Exercise of governmental prerogative by public officials capable of central direction and control
implies that effective sanctions can be mobilized to preclude the hold
out strategy and that management programs can be undertaken to
develop a common property resource or produce a public good.
In any management program recourse to a hierarchical command
structure will be economically advantageous whenever production
processes require pooling efforts through division of labor and use of
common production facilities. This rationale applies to both private
firms and public agencies. If a firm can conduct business under the
management of an entrepreneur at a lesser cost than if each and
every transaction were organized as a market transaction, both the
entrepreneur and the employees of the firm can derive a benefit from
agreeing to act in accordance with the decisions of the entrepreneur
in allocating work assignments among several different employees. 2 2
Bureaucratic organization is a method for enhancing efficiency in
operations by minimizing decision costs within the limits or zones of
authority provided by the employment contract and the competitive
force of the product market.
When bureaucratic organization is applied to provision of public
goods and services, a number of sources for potential institutional
weakness or institutional failure become apparent. In the absence of
an exclusion principle, the competitive force of a product market
does not affect many public organizations. As a consequence, entrepreneurs in such organizations will be less sensitive to diseconomics
of scale which accrue from increasing management costs as the size
of a public organization increases. Furthermore, we can anticipate
that any organization will reach a point where the management cost
22. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386-485 (1937).
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of supervising more employees will exceed the marginal value added
by the productivity of the marginal employee. Beyond that point a
growth in organizational size will generate a net economic loss or
yield a decreasing social return.
Gordon Tullock in The Politics of Bureaucracy analyzes the consequences which follow when rational, self-interested individuals
23
pursue maximizing strategies in very large public bureaucracies.
Tullock's "economic man" is an ambitious public employee who
seeks promotions within a bureaucracy. Since career advancement
depends upon favorable recommendations by his superiors, a careeroriented public servant will act so as to please his superior. Favorable
information will be forwarded, unfavorable information will be repressed. This distortion of information will diminish control and
generate expectations which diverge from conditions as they are.
Large scale bureaucracies will thus become error prone and too cumbersome to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. Efforts to correct
the malfunctioning of bureaucracies by tightening control will simply
magnify errors. A decline in return to scale can be expected to result.
The larger the organization becomes, the smaller the percentage of its
activities that will be directly related to output and the larger the
proportion of its efforts that will be expended on management.
Tullock suggests that the limits on control in the very large public
bureaucracy will engender a "bureaucratic free enterprise" where
individuals and groups within an organization proceed to formulate
their own missions, increasingly pursuing opportunities for side payoff, graft and corruption. Goal displacement and risk avoidance
motivated by individual self-interest will generate organizational
dysfunctions as elaborate justifications are fabricated to cover potential exposures to the scrutiny of superior authorities. The social
consequences generated by an organization become increasingly
contradictory and unreal when compared to public rhetoric.
Once a public good is provided, the absence of an exclusion principle also implies that each individual using such a service will have
little choice but to take advantage of whatever is provided unless he
is either able to move to another jurisdiction or is wealthy enough to
make separate provision for himself. Under these conditions, the
producer of a public good may also be relatively free to induce
savings in production costs by shifting some of the burdens or costs
of production to users or consumers of the service. Shifts of producer costs to users may result in an aggregate loss of efficiency as
savings on the production side are exceeded by added costs on the
consumption side.
23. G. Tullock, Politics of Bureaucracy (1965).
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The inability of users of public goods and services to sustain an
arm's length relationship with producers of public goods and services
generates further problems when user preferences may change in
relation to the available supply of public goods and services. No one
can know the preferences or values of other persons apart from
giving those persons an opportunity to express them. If public
agencies are organized so that different communities of people cannot express their diverse preferences, producers of public goods and
services will act without information as to the changing preferences
of the persons they serve. Expenditures will be made with little
reference to consumer utility. Producer efficiency in the absence of
consumer utility is without economic meaning.
Other difficulties are engendered when conditions of demand for a
public good or service increase in relation to the available supply.
When demands begin to exceed supply, the dynamics inherent in the
tragedy of the commons may arise all over again. A congested street
or highway will, for example, carry less and less traffic as the demand
grows. What was once a public good may now become a public bad
as congested and noisy traffic precludes a growing number of opportunities for alternative uses.2 4 In short, public goods may be subject
to serious erosion or degradation under conditions of changing
demands. In the absence of capability to respond with modified
supply schedules and regulations for use, a public good may come to
be a public bad and the tragedy of the commons can reach critical or
explosive proportions.
Finally, producer performance and user interests are closely tied
together when we recognize that the capacity to levy taxes, to make
appropriate expenditure decisions and to provide the necessary
public facilities is insufficient for optimal use of such facilities. One
pattern of use may impair the value of a common facility or a public
good for another pattern of use. The development of water resource
facilities, for example, will be insufficient if it enhances the welfare
for members of a community of users without attention to basic
rules and regulations controlling the use of such facilities by different
sets of users. Use of streams for discharge of waste can become a
dominant use which will force out other users.
Optimal use of public facilities, when each use is not fully compatible with each other use, requires development of a system of
rules and regulations establishing capabilities and setting limitations
on the discretion which persons can exercise in using common facilities. Development of such rules and regulations is relevant both to
24. J. Buchanan, Public Goods and Public Bads, in Financing the Metropolis (J. Crecine
ed., 1970).
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scheduling production processes and to ordering use patterns of potential users and consumers. These rules and regulations, like any set
of decision rules, are not self-generating, self-modifying nor selfenforcing. Thus, we are confronted with the basic problems of who
shall enact and enforce rules to govern relations among individuals
who use common properties or public facilities. These rules and regulations in effect establish essential property interests among the users
of public goods and services.
While bureaucratic organization will contribute significant institutional capabilities to any enterprise or agency concerned with control
of externalities, management of a common property or provision of a
public good, such a form of organization is also subject to serious
institutional weaknesses and failures. An optimal structure for a
public enterprise would take account of diversities in user preferences and in production economies, relationship of demand to
supply, and relationships in which one pattern of use may impair
other patterns of use. The very large bureaucracy will: 1) become
increasingly indiscriminating in its response to diverse demands, 2)
impose increasingly high social costs upon those who are presumed
to be the beneficiaries, 3) fail to proportion supply to demand, 4)
allow public goods to erode by failing to take actions to prevent one
use from dominatiig other uses, 5) become increasingly error prone
and uncontrollable to the point where public actions deviate radically from public rhetoric, and 6) eventually lead to a circumstance
where remedial actions exacerbate rather than ameliorate problems.
The Constitution of Self-Governing Public Enterprises
If individuals are to surmount the problems inherent in the
tragedy of the commons and avoid the pathologies of the fully
developed bureaucracy, they are confronted with the task of creating
alternative arrangements for organization of collective and public
enterprises. The structure of events inherent in a common property
resource or a public good situation provides a basis for conceptualizing the community of interests which must be taken into account in
designing alternative institutional arrangements. An inchoate community is formed by the individuals who use or enjoy a common
property resource or a public good. The domain of the common
property or the public good defines and bounds the community of
interest.
If the object of interest can be identified, courses of action can be
examined to determine which alternatives will enhance the welfare of
that community of individuals. If some form of joint action is avail-
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able which would leave each individual better off provided that all
members of the community were required to contribute proportionately, each person will be motivated to devise and agree to a set of
decision rules authorizing action on behalf of the community of
individuals. Such rules would require some form of coercion to insure that each individual will bear his proportionate share of the
burden.
"Bureaucratic free enterprise" need not be the vice that Tullock
implied if 1) a bureaucracy is immediately accountable to the relevant community of interest for which it is acting, 2) the costs of
providing a joint good are funded by the constituents in proportion
to their benefit or in accordance with some comparable rule of
equity, and 3) public facilities are subject to use under terms and
conditions which are considered by the relevant community to be
reasonably designed to advance their common welfare. If these conditions can be met, a self-governing collective enterprise may be
designed that is capable of internalizing decisionmaking arrangements
appropriate to the community of interests associated with the
management of a common property or the provision of a public
good. Reliance upon external decision structures would be necessary
only under conditions 1) where adequate remedies are not available
for resolving local conflicts within the decision structures afforded
by the constitution of such an enterprise, or 2) where the operation
of a public enterprise is conducted in a manner that causes injuries to
others outside its boundaries.
If such conditions are to be met, the structure of public administration cannot be organized apart from processes of political
choice, which provide means for 1) expression of social preferences
of individuals within the community being served, 2) formulation,
enforcement and revision of the decision rules governing both producer performance and conditions of consumer use, and 3) articulation and enforcement of demands made by individual users against
producers. In the production and exchange of purely private goods
and services, money as a medium of exchange can be used as a
measure of value and as an expression of consumer utility. Public
goods are not subject to exchange, and market price cannot be used
as an appropriate measure of user preference. The constitution of
public enterprises must depend instead upon the development, of
political mechanisms such as voting, representation, legislation and
adjudication for people to express their interests.
The development of organizational arrangements which provide
opportunities for persons to signal their agreements and disagree-
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ments can be conceptualized as a problem of constitutional choice.
Constitutional choice is simply a choice of decision rules, assigning
decisionmaking capabilities among a community of people. It does
not include appropriating funds or acting to alter events except to
provide a decisionmaking structure for ordering the choice of future
decisionmakers.
The rudiments of a theory of constitutional choice applicable to
the organization of a public enterprise has been developed in The
Calculus of Consent.2" According to the authors, a representative
individual wanting to form an organization to provide a public good
would need to take two types of costs into account: 1) external
costs, which are defined as those costs an individual would expect to
bear as a result of decisions which deviate from his preferences and
impose deprivations upon him; and 2) decisionmaking costs, which
are defined as the expenditure of resources, time, effort and opportunities foregone in decision rules which specify the proportion of
individuals required to agree prior to future collective action.
Expected external costs will be at their highest point where any
one person can take action on behalf of the entire collectivity. Such
costs would decline as the proportion of members participating in
collective decisionmaking increases. Expected external costs would
reach zero where all were required to agree prior to collective action
under a rule of unanimity. However, expected decisionmaking costs
would have the opposite trend. These expenditures would be
minimal if one person could make future collective decisions for the
whole group of affected individuals. Such costs would increase to
their highest point with a rule of unanimity.
If a constitutional decisionmaker were a cost minimizer, and the
two types of costs described above were an accurate representation
of the costs he perceives, we would expect him to prefer the constitutional choice of a decision rule where the two cost curves intersect.
When the two cost curves are roughly symmetrical, some form of
simple majority vote would be a rational choice of a voting rule. If
expected external costs were far greater than expected decisionmaking costs, an extraordinary majority would be the rational choice
of a voting rule. Such a rule of extraordinary majority would apply
where expected decision costs would be of minor magnitude providing that a reasonably optimal set of constitutional rules could be
devised which would not impose high deprivations upon any particular element of the community. On the other hand, if the opportunity
costs inherent in decisionmaking were expected to be very large in
25. J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).
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comparison to external costs, then reliance might be placed on a rule
authorizing collective action by the decision of one person in the
extreme case requiring rapid response.
If the following conditions can be met, appropriate decisionmaking arrangements will be available for a community of people to
organize themselves as a self-governing public enterprise and take
advantage of a common property resource under relatively optimal
circumstances: 1) boundary conditions are properly drawn to
encompass the domain of the common property; 2) only such
developments are undertaken where benefits exceed costs; 3) costs
are allocable among members of the community in proportion to
benefit; 4) costs can be collected from each potential beneficiary in
the form of user charges, yield taxes or other appropriate forms of
taxation, and any potential hold outs can be precluded from not
assuming his share of the burden; 5) substantial consensus exists
regarding the terms and conditions for constituting the collective
enterprise; 6) decision rules are divided so that the provision of service will reflect changing user needs, preferences and levels of
demand; 7) an efficient production team can be organized to operate
the common facilities and provide service to each user that is responsive to his demands; and 8) any one person (or any group of persons)
has access to remedies where he can enforce his claims for service and
assert his interests in the enterprise.
The Development of Multi-OrganizationalArrangements
Assuming that a self-governing public enterprise can be organized
under relatively optimal conditions to develop a common property
resource or provide a public good, there remain a number of problems which may be sources of institutional weakness or failure. First,
a public enterprise may generate externalities that impinge upon
others beyond its borders. If the externalities are negative, it may be
necessary to limit and control those externalities. If the externalities
are positive, supplementary expenditures may be required to sustain
an optimal yield of them. Second, common properties may come in
many different shapes and forms with significant elements of jointness or interdependency among the various uses that can be made of
different common property resources. Water resource systems, for
example, present a baffling array of problems associated with persistent interdependencies among many joint uses. Interdependencies
among water related uses may also be interconnected with interdependencies involving land uses, energy supply systems, and transport systems. But each use may also involve independencies so that
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its provision requires separate consideration on its own merit. The
economic interest of each individual is also likely to include a
demand for a wide spectrum of uses in appropriate proportions
rather than demands for one use to the exclusion of another. Every
individual is simultaneously a water user and a water polluter, and
both contingencies need to be taken into account. Third, where conflicts arise, institutional facilities need to be available for processing
conflict and searching out resolutions that will preclude the tragedy
of the commons from working itself out at some new level of interdependency.
Some political economists have suggested that these problems can
best be resolved by taking advantage of the overlapping jurisdictions
and fragmentation of authority inherent in the American system of
government. Mancur Olson, for example, has suggested:
Only if there are several levels of government, and a large number of

governments, can immense disparities between the boundaries of
jurisdictions and the boundaries of collective goods be avoided.

There is a case for every type of institution from the international
organization to the smallest local government. It is the merit of the
present approach that it can help explain the need for both central2

ized and decentralized units of government in the same context. 6

This solution is the antithesis of that proposed by management
analysts in the public administration tradition. Instead of chaos and
disorder, these political economists perceive a pattern of ordered
relationships among diverse public enterprises which is analogous to
the order existing among the many different private enterprises
functionirlg in the context of a private industry. Thus, complex sets
of multiorganizational relationships might be characterized as forming public service industries.2 '
Within a public service industry, key relationships among enterprises involve the terms of trade, contractual relationships, competitive rivalry, and cooperative arrangements for coordinated action.
Chief executives and hierarchical structures may or may not be
important coordinating mechanisms in this context. Patterns of
competitive rivalry and cooperative action sustained through private
associations and consortia are far more important in maintaining
ordered relationships in the American system of higher education,
26. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Comm., Subcomm. on Economy in Government, 1
The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The P. P. B. System, 91st Cong., 1st

Sess. 327 (1969).
27. V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, A BehavioralApproach to the Study of Intergovernmental
Relations, 359 Annals 137-46 (1965).
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for example, than the administrative command structure emanating
from the offices of state governors.
Similar analytical perspectives can be used in viewing the
American system of water resource development as a public service
industry composed of both public and private enterprises. What
might be characterized as the California water industry, for example,
is composed of approximately 1,200 mutual water companies, 300
to 400 private public utility companies, numerous municipal water
departments and agencies, including the Los Angeles and San Francisco municipal systems, several hundred public districts including
such large scale operations as the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California and the East Bay Municipal Utility District, and
the large scale water production agencies such as the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, the United States Corps of Engineers and the
California Department of Water Resources. 2 8 The performance of
the California water industry would be assessed by examining the
economic conduct of different water agencies within the industry in
developing and proportioning supply to demand. Emphasis would be
placed upon investment decisions, development policies and pricing
arrangements rather than perfection of hierarchical organization in
an integrated chain of command culminating in control by a single
chief executive.
Several potential advantages can be derived from a political system
which affords opportunities for overlapping jurisdictions and fragmentation of authority. Some of the potential advantages which
might be gained from overlapping jurisdictions include the following:
1. Advantage can be taken of diverse scale economies. Problems in
the design and operation of a water distribution system or the
management of a ground water basin may involve quite different
economies of scale and the proportioning of different interests from
the problem of dealing with a large river system extending over
several states. Yet, the diverse economies of scale may need to
complement each other when a ground water management program
operates in conjunction with water transfers associated with large
scale water resource development projects which divert water for use
on overlying land.
2. Consideration of consumer or user interests can be partially
disaggregated from producer interests. The difficulty of sustaining an
arm's length relationship between the producer and consumer of
public goods and services can be partially resolved if sufficient over28. J. Bain, R. Caves and J. Margolis, Northern California's Water Industry: The Comparative Efficiency of Public Enterprise in Developing a Scarce Natural Resource (1966).

NA TURA L RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

lap exists among different units of government. Elements of bargaining power are articulated in the California water industry in negotiations between water distribution agencies and water production
agencies. Interests of recreational groups are beginning to be articulated. Public sanitation engineers have demonstrated some entrepreneurship in making reclaimed waste water available for public
enjoyment as in the case of Golden Gate Park or for sale to groundwater replenishment districts.
3. Fiscal transfers can alter product mix in the provision of public
goods and services. 2 9 The expenditure of federal funds to build
municipal sewerage plants, for example, may or may not have a
significant effect upon the waste load being carried by a water supply
system. Federal funds may be a useful source of supplementary
funds for investment in sewerage facilities provided that other waste
dischargers are not able to function as "free riders" and increase their
waste discharges. As Irving Fox has emphasized, large expenditures
for secondary treatment of municipal sewage may have a relatively
small marginal effect upon the waste load carried by a stream when
compared with other sources of waste discharge. 3 0
4. The probability of error is reduced as the opportunity for
critical scrutiny by persons occupying positions of independent
authority is increased. Where the work of large scale public bureaucracies is not subject to critical scrutiny we can expect pronounced
tendencies toward the suppression of conflicting information and
analysis and the repression of disagreement. These possibilities can be
reduced if promotional agencies are required to stand critical
scrutiny in a planning review process, a scrutiny of yield or rate of
return on investment, and an evaluation of performance.
5. If two or more types of public services are equally necessary
for the public welfare but involve interdependencies having a high
level of potential conflict, there will be less likelihood that one use
will be subordinated to another use if each service is sustained by a
relatively autonomous public enterprise. The opportunity costs
associated with many types of water use will involve elements of
pollution and the impairment of water for other associated uses.
Unless a high degree of autonomy exists among agencies which make
provision for the different patterns of use, one type of use is likely to
dominate other types of use.
Any system of government which relies upon multiorganizational
29. R. Wagner, The Fiscal Organization of American Federalism (1971).
30. Fox, Institutional Design for Water Quality Management-The Implications of a
Systems Approach for Legal and Administrative Arrangements, in Natural Resource Systems
Models in Decision Making 212 (G. Toebes ed., 1970).
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arrangements to provide a rich mix of potentially competing public
services will find it necessary to develop independent informational,
consultative and deliberative mechanisms where conflict can be
processed in an orderly way to reach mutually satisfactory resolutions. Such institutional facilities are afforded equity proceedings in
the courts, representative boards and commissions, inter-agency
committees, joint councils, consultative conferences and a variety of
different voluntary associations. Such arrangements, when taken
together with quasi-market structures, provide the basis for sustaining a vastly different system of public administration that far exceeds
the productive potential of the French and Prussian systems of
administration which Woodrow Wilson and those who have followed
in his footsteps have used as models of administrative perfection.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The thesis has been advanced that overlapping jurisdictions and
fragmentation of authority are sources of strength rather than weakness in public service industries in the American system of public
administration. However, such systems are also subject to serious
shortcomings which reflect elements of institutional weakness or
failure. I shall indicate some of these shortcomings by reference to
the American water industry, then review some of the conditions
that have contributed to these shortcomings and suggest some means
that may be available for remedying those weaknesses by drawing
upon the industry concept.
Shortcomings
The basic shortcoming of the American water industry is overinvestment in water resource facilities, overdevelopment of some
water services and a correlative underdevelopment of other water
services. 1Overinvestment has lead to misallocation, which can be
expected to aggravate demands for still further investments to alleviate the costs of prior misallocations. The most serious misallocation
is associated with distinctly common property or public good uses
such as water quality, sustenance of fish and wildlife resources and
related public uses of water systems.
Two points of caution should be introduced into this assessment.
First, patterns of overinvestment, overdevelopment and misallocation
31. J. Hirschliefer, J. Dellaven and J. Milliman, Water Supply (1960). The conclusion is
reached that ". . major water resource developments are typically undertaken prematurely
and on an overly ambitious scale. The dynamics of overdevelopment lead to large-scale
projects where small-scale increments in water projects are ignored. The larger the scale of
the agency, the greater its propensity for overdevelopment. "'Id.at 358. (Emphasis added.)
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will not apply uniformly to all areas or regions of the United States.
Second, in many areas of the world, problems of overdevelopment
might be viewed as a rather benign affliction. Much of the world cries
out because of problems of underdevelopment. This point needs to
be emphasized that the American system of public enterprises is
immensely productive and it is productive precisely because of the
extensive opportunities for public entrepreneurship afforded by a
system of overlapping jurisdictions and fragmented authority.
Conditions Contributingto Overdevelopment and Misallocation
With these words of caution, it is important to recognize that
conditions giving rise to contemporary political rhetoric about water
"crises" and environmental "crises" are largely artifacts, products, or
consequences of existing public policies. These conditions are
explicit manifestations of the problems generated by overdevelopment and misallocation. I shall attempt to indicate some public
policies and public programs which have contributed to the contemporary water "crisis" and environmental "crisis."
1. Public policies associated with the homestead movement and
the settlement of the West still permeate national "reclamation"
policies and have the effect of sustaining substantial public subsidies
for large quantities of water supplied at nominal costs for agricultural
purposes in the arid regions of the West.
2. Public policies associated with the stimulation of work relief
projects during the Depression of the 1930's continue to have a
significant effect in the allocation of costs for flood control projects.
3. The concept of long-term comprehensive planning has not
proved to be helpful in taking account of opportunity costs associated with water resource development programs. Rather, the concept implies no limits and serves as a pious platitude covering
multitudinous sins of ommission. Intelligent planning is of critical
importance. Analytical rigor requires specification of the variables
used in any planning effort and specification of limits in an explicit
acknowledgement of at least some of the variables not being considered. Human fallibility requires careful attention to both time and
use limitations. Any pretense of omniscience will simply amplify the
probability of error.
The relationship of the above policy conditions to the development of the Central Valley Project in California is an interesting
subject for speculation. On the basis of cost sharing formulas in
operation during the late 1920's, the Army Corps of Engineers considered Shasta Dam and related works in the CVP to be economically
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infeasible. A similar conclusion was reluctantly reached by the State
of California. In light of the unemployment problems of the Great
Depression the Bureau of Reclamation was, in effect, able to underbid the Corps of Engineers in entrepreneuring the CVP. The cost
sharing formulas in the Flood Control Acts of 1936 and 1938
enabled the Corps in turn to underbid the Bureau on projects in
Tulare basin. Bureau projects were undertaken and project benefits
were made available without prior execution of contractual agreements with potential beneficiaries, further weakening the financial
structure of the CVP. The engineering of the CVP gave little attention to the developmental opportunities associated with groundwater
supplies, to the problems of sewering the valley as a necessary
consequence of "full" development, and to other opportunity costs.
Problems associated with agricultural subsidies and growing demands
for urban water use in turn contributed to the entry of the California
Department of Water Resources as the third major producer in the
Central Valley.
4. Laws at both the state and federal levels tend to identify
"interested parties" as public authorities or those who have profitable interests in relation to private proprietorships and to exclude
those persons who derive a common benefit from a common or
public property. Individual persons are excluded as interested parties
in adversary proceedings even though resource development programs may impair their use of some common property. In short,
substantial disabilities have been built into the structure of public
law which in part explains "the paradox of public goods failing to
claim the public interest." 3 2 The basic concepts of limited liability
and sovereign immunity as applied to both private and public corporations and governmental agencies need to be reconsidered for
their effect upon developmental programs. Limited liability and legal
immunity for some decisionmakers necessarily implies legal disabilities for others.
5. Insufficient consideration has been given to an economic calculus that is relevant to public investment in the provision of public
goods and services as distinguished from the private investment in the
market economy. The Office of Management and Budget has been
much more concerned with occupying a suite in the Executive Office
of the President than with development of analytical capabilities for
minimizing the opportunity costs associated with public expenditure
decisions. The use of market criteria in benefit-cost analysis can have
32. Bain, Caves and Margolis, supra note 28 at 652; R. Bish and V. Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government: Metropolitan Reform Reconsidered (1973).
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the consequence of building facilities which are too small to meet
demand in the absence of charges or regulations controlling the
pattern of use. Money and physical works will be insufficient to
sustain optimal use of common properties and public facilities without commensurate capabilities for proportioning patterns of use to
conditions of supply.
Some Suggestions for Policy Change
If the assessment that public policies are the principal contributors
to the basic shortcoming of overdevelopment and misallocation is
correct, what possibilities might be pursued as a means of remedying
such shortcomings? I will make a few suggestions, with the warning
that relatively moderate adjustments may produce significant
changes if they are strategically selected:
1. Terminate all federal non-reimbursable public expenditures and
public subsidies for water resource development by some specified
cut-off date, e.g., 1980. Alternative modes of funding, including user
charges or yield, severance or depletion taxes, would need to be
explored for sustaining reimbursability.
2. Consider the possibility of requiring full compensation for the
opportunity costs foregone where any public use is impaired or
sacrificed as an adjunct of a development program. Constitutional
provisions requiring just compensation for the taking of private
property should be extended to cover all common properties and
public properties. All water rights, including those exercised by
federal agencies, might be subject to a yield tax base upon the value
of water at its source for alternative uses foregone. Thus, the Bureau
of Reclamation might be expected to generate revenues to cover the
cost of the salmon fishery sacrificed on the San Joaquin River, and
an appropriate fishery agency could use the revenue to generate an
alternative in the stock of fishery resources.
3. Develop regional water exchange agreements, including provision for buying and selling short and intermediate term leasehold
irterests in alternative sources of water supply including reclaimed
waste waters.
4. Redefine rights to common property resources so as to recognize individual persons as interested parties entitled to equitable consideration of their beneficial interests in such common properties and
to remedies for any impairment of such interests.
5. Extend authorization of inter-agency contractual arrangements
for the provision of engineering and planning services and joint
operations among public water agencies across local, state and federal
jurisdictional boundaries.
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These suggestions indicate the thrust of some possibilities that
might be considered in modifying the structure of incentives which
would alter the priorities of water resource development. Serious
considerations of such possibilities would have to be based upon
more careful and more extensive analysis than given in this paper.
CONCLUSION
Given the problem of market failure that will occur when many
patterns of resource utilization are subject to consumption by a
community of users and where exclusion is infeasible, we can
anticipate that some form of public organization is necessary to
avoid the tragedy of the commons. The appropriate form of public
solution is the subject of fundamental disagreement between those
who support the traditional public administration and contemporary
political economists who rely upon a theory of public goods and the
principle of fiscal equivalence. The first approach argues that principles of hierarchical organization provide the requisites for coordinated actions in realizing the common benefits of collective action.
The second approach contends that large scale hierarchical organizations are subject to such serious losses of information and control
that failures in performance will occur. Which explanation is best
supported by empirical evidence can be determined only in light of
empirical research. 3 I In the meantime, those who advocate public
solutions for changing the structure of property rights in resource
development and utilization should proceed with caution.

33. E. Ostrom, W. Baugh, R. Guarasci, R. Parks and G. Whitaker, Community Organization and the Provisions of Police Services (Sage Professional Papers in Administrative and
Policy Studies 03-001, 1973).

